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Abstract:
The loi cadre (1956) was not a final submission to the political realities of a moribund empire. Rather it was an attempt to fundamentally redefine the nature of interaction between the Métropole and her colonies. This was perhaps most telling in French West Africa, where the co-option of political elites was the spearhead of a greater swathe of subtle reforms. Administrators set up a situation wherein the economic fundamentals of French West Africa became functionally separated from the political reality. This allowed for an increasing dynamism in the political foreground, granting autonomy to local assemblies and playing off interest groups against each other whilst strengthening the economic fundamentals that bound French West Africa to the Métropole. This article examines the interactions between government reforms and private investment to highlight the parapolitical interests inherent in colonial administration, helping to outline the continuities that defined the post-colonial relationship.

I
The loi cadre of 1956 changed how France interacted with her colonies, extending electoral suffrage to most men and women in the empire whilst allowing for greater autonomy of local administrative assemblies. This altered the relationship between the Metropolitan centre and the colonial periphery by placing the burden of low-level, local administration on autochthonous officials whilst the over-arching regulatory framework remained rigged in France's favour.  The loi cadre was an active attempt by French authorities to regain the initiative of colonial reform whilst pandering to popular opinion both within the Métropole and amongst the political classes of the empire. Of particular interest here is Afrique-Occidentale Française (AOF) where economic development became bound to political reform. It also changed the nature of French economic engagement with West Africa, diversifying government investment and empowering private capital in profitable extractive industries. This change demonstrates the importance of fiscal and developmental reform to government policy as it was intended in 1956 and to the reactive form it assumed after 1958.
Historical engagement with the loi cadre has increased significantly in recent years, with a seeming gap in the historiography filled by reappraisals which stress the importance of the framework law. Tony Chafer has highlighted the role of the loi cadre in disaggregating African states, noting that individual nations were pushed away from federalisation and towards 'balkanisation' by shifting the focus of politics to individual territories.​[1]​ This places the loi cadre at the head of a movement towards devolving responsibilities, amidst a clamour for increasing rights from colonial subjects desirous of citizenship in West Africa and elsewhere. Frederick Cooper also highlights the importance of 'territorialization' as a key policy in shifting the burden of an empire of citizens, as implied by growing cries for equivalence, on to regional powers.​[2]​ Appreciating this dynamic, Alexander Keese stresses that the loi cadre was 'a revolutionary step in French colonial policy', signalling as it did a specifically targeted attempt at the Africanization of local assemblies and a negotiated transfer of some powers.​[3]​ Importantly, this has altered the language in which the reform is considered: no longer does it appear as a slide towards decolonization, but an active attempt to re-negotiate the imperial policy and perpetuate French influence overseas. The former obscurity of the loi cadre — like that of a whole raft of legal reforms that took place in the 1950s — had been a function of the dominant assumption of the French decolonization narrative, namely the supposed ‘inevitability’ of the end of empire. In recent years, this concept of inevitability has been roundly challenged, with Todd Sheppard in particular detailing the conceptual 'invention' of decolonization as a term in the early 1960s.​[4]​  Understanding the loi cadre in terms of a narrative of dynamic colonial reform, where contingency rather than inevitability is the rule, changes the perspective of analysis from one of inevitable decline to historical futurity. In this perspective, the administrators and so-called ‘grey blurs’ of French bureaucracy take on a new significance. Rather than inscrutable footnotes to history, they become vital features of the colonial landscape during a period of political uncertainty in the Métropole. 
Indeed, an analysis of the interactions between colonial governors regarding reforms in their territories reveals a very real desire to extend and refine French governance in perpetuity. Archival material from France’s Overseas Ministry, where the loi cadre was planned and its impact monitored, demonstrates that colonial officials were convinced of their role, as shown by confident economic and social plans projected into a colonial future. It also indicates that Metropolitan officials likewise relied on the income streams from the colonies and actively sought to cultivate emergent methods of rule designed to alter the language of colonial interaction, as will be shown. This change in attitudes to colonial interaction exemplified the increasingly technocratic stance of the Fourth Republic largely side-stepping the rhetoric of any dominant political affiliation. The creation of a colonial market beholden to France’s targeted development industries ensured that the principles of protectionism practiced at home could be transposed into an international setting.
Crucially, this is not an attempt to revive an overtly Marxist reading of decolonization, but to recondition the importance of the loi cadre by understanding how it altered the relationships between political power and economic realities in French West Africa. Instead of reading French resignation, one can instead point to subtle macroeconomic entanglement that reduced the cost of direct administration whilst ensuring a corresponding controlling stake in the industries which constituted the greatest determinants in the politics of AOF. The loi cadre was the most visible first step in a process which sought to ensure that lessening direct administration did not impact on the retention of control, influence and, most importantly, profitability.

II
The loi cadre did not prove an overly controversial measure to pass in the National Assembly: it garnered some 446 supporting votes, with only ninety-eight dissenting along the lines of traditional conservatism. When the plan was put to the French Union Assembly it was resoundingly accepted by 124 votes against one unidentified doubter.​[5]​ The documentary trail generated by the loi cadre demonstrates that at every level of French governmental involvement, there endured a belief in the viability of France’s colonial project predominated overthat resisted any jaundiced slide towards relinquishing control of French African possessions. Between 1946 and 1954, according to the Haut Commissaire of XXX, Bernard . Cornut-Gentille, AOF had become the “continent de la fidélité”.​[6]​ Recognising emergent threats was a prudent attempt to manage that status and not a sudden inversion of old assumptions, especially in a climate of colonial tumult right across the world. In Cornut-Gentille’s 1954 report, he summed up well the task of reformers relying on an intricate knowledge of power structures and economic controls:
“C’est un fait que l’A.O.F. de 1954 apparait à l’observateur superficiel comme une oasis dans un monde où e nombreux Pays se montrent plus agités qu’elle et c’est un fait que cette Fédération est dans 95% de ses éléments profondément attachée à la France.
	Cependant, c’est un fait aussi, qu’après sept ans de séjour en Afrique Noire, je perçois, sur place mieux que personne, les éléments d’inquiètude que peut poser l’évolution accélérée actuellement en cours en A.O.F.”​[7]​
However, wWithin this reform package, therefore, lay a realistic appreciation of inherent administrative frailties with a corresponding desire to adapt the mechanisms of political representation and economic management. The loi cadre was not only appealing at an executive level, but also effectively capitalised on popular Metropolitan support for less involved colonial attachment and indigenous support for continued association. When he pushed the loi through the National Assembly, Gaston Defferre, the socialist mayor of Marseille and Minister for Overseas France, was respondingresponded to an increasing sense of Metropolitan tension in the colonial situation; this, dictating dictated the speed with which the long-planned legislation was finally enacted, if not in fact its character. Chafer, in turn, highlights the public sympathy for criticisms of colonial involvement as symptomatic of a wider dissatisfaction, specifically citing the rise of Cartièerisme and the growing influence of Jean-Paul Sartre and the group around Les Temps Modernes.​[8]​ With the loi cadre, French authorities tried to regain the initiative of colonial reform whilst being sympathetic to prevailing popular opinion. whilst pandering to popular opinion both within the Métropole and amongst the political classes of AOF. Indeed, the shift was one away from politics as defined by equivalence to the French Métropole and towards Africa as a distinct and inherently different national structure.​[9]​ 
	Defferre’s loi cadre was, then, seen by some as reflective of Mendès-France’s conciliatory tone in colonial matters which had dominated the last government, with a new socialist majority having been elected under Guy Mollet in January of 1956 on the basis of pursuing peace in Algeria.​[10]​ French withdrawal from Indochina and the granting of independence ofto Morocco and Tunisia had been met with revulsion by right-wing political commentators wary of a 'sell-out' to anti-colonialists.​[11]​ A cautious approach, as advocated by Mollet was, then, the preferred option, as France sought colonial reform over revolution. The increasing unpopularity of the colonial project, however, demanded a more radical approach, with the changes wrought by the loi cadre popularly viewed by some as uninspiring; in Le Provençal Deferre rounded on critics who wanted a harder line on the colonies, claiming:.
"Ils n'ont même pas voulu de ce semblant de statut... Tout engagement, même limité à de vagues principes, même à terme, leur fait horreur. Ils n'en veulent pas. Ils ne veulent céder sur rien. Ils veulent maintenir tous les privilèges, tous les abus..."​[12]​ 
The loi cadre was passed on 23 June and Cartier’s criticism was published on the 3 September 1956. The French government’s attempt to regain the initiative in colonial reform had failed in the public consciousness, with a developing malaise three months after what was intended to be the most fundamental revision of colonial interaction since the very constitution of the Fourth Republic. Between the abandonment advocated by the Cartièriste school of thought and the desire for traditional exploitation maintained by the opposition, Mollet’s government (inspired in part by Mendès-France’s economic specialism) opted for the propagation of more subtle links to the erstwhile placid AOF, ensuring dependency overwrote the political desire for autonomy
Beyond the reforming of representative structures, however, the loi cadre was aimed designed largely at to expanding and refineing credit structures and to ensureing the continued health of colonial markets.​[13]​ In part, this was designed intended to impose the structures of French administration on societies which otherwise might remain remote or resistant to development trends. ​[14]​ By focussing on development, colonial administrators could work with private finance (both external and African traders) to create infrastructure and stimulate production whilst minimising the risk to the colonial state. The loi cadre was designed to strengthen the foundations of the French control of AOF not only in terms of political stability, but also by ensuring that the core economic principles which had always governed colonial profit margins held true - monopoly of market, product and route to market.​[15]​ The economic interests of France in her former colonies were thus seen as 'both parallel and integral to the promotion of French culture,' a fact which ensured that as long as the 'rayonnement' of French universalism held its lustre, West African states would remain fiscally bound to Metropolitan France.​[16]​
	This approach fed on the conclusions of the Comité d 'Études de l'Integration Économique de la Métropole et des Pays d'Outre-Mer,​[17]​ a powerful committee of the central planning Ministry founded in 1954. They doubted the sustainability of existing economic relationships because of the vulnerability of the mercantilist model to pressure for liberalization led by the United States and its inability to attract foreign investment.​[18]​ With Metropolitan industry operating in a broadly protectionist market during the 1950s, the central tenets of colonial administration saw the AOF importing 'seuls les produits métropolitains.'​[19]​ Indeed, between 1946 and 1956, exports from Metropolitan France to the colonies had averaged 37.6 per cent of total exports, and imports had constituted an average 24.4 per cent of total value.​[20]​ This was an expensive process, with high prices and inefficiency characterizing both ends of the French mercantilist model. The loi cadre did not, however, dramatically alter this process. After this period, imports from the Empire increased significantly, Senegal's exports of peanut oil to France rose 26 per cent between 1957 and 1960, Dahomey exported 31 per cent more palm oil and the states which constituted French Equatorial Africa exported 75 per cent more wood back to the Métropole.​[21]​ These are significant figures which indicate a considerable economic entanglement. 
	The Empire accepted 37.4 per cent of France’s exports and furnished 27.5 per cent of its imports in 1958, yet the end of Empire did not bring about a collapse in the French economy. Jacques Marseille posits that this was due to the fact that, even as late as 1982, less than 150 companies were responsible for 42 per cent of sales and 45 per cent of purchases from abroad.​[22]​ The concentration of these industries enabled targeted investment to be realised and guided by para-political interests, often drawing on the same clientelist networks strengthened by the loi cadre's devolution of authority. These interests brought together the political concerns of public, state expenditure with private investment concerns. As such, it is important not to cast the loi cadre as a moment of fracture in Metropolitan economic engagement with French Africa; it did not move to address the trade deficit between the Métropole and the colonies, but rather sought to reduce comparable investment levels by reforming structures of representation and moving away from direct administration.
	Contemporary scholars such as Cooper, Chafer and Shepard have criticised teleological readings of decolonisation, thus inviting a reconsideration of economic planning during this era. Jacques Marseille's reading of the end of Empire offers perhaps a more traditional view of this process, albeit acknowledging the importance of economic concerns to colonial administrators. In particular, he criticizes the left for having unrealistic hopes for the colonies and expecting too much of reforms in the 1950s, 
"II leur sera douloureux d'accepter l'idée qu'il ne leur appartenait pas de décider du destin des populations colonisées et des risques de leur liberté."​[23]​
Yet by removing the terminal context of 'decolonisation', we begin to see the means in which economic restructuring offered a positive vision for continued entanglement conceived in the interests of the Métropole and of private capital, but not especially of any distinct political faction.​[24]​
By ensuring a captive market for French products, Mollet’s government safeguarded the immediate future of French industry, allowing it a soft-landing amidst demands for modernisation as part of European integration, whilst also laying down the guidelines of continued colonial interaction. In this sense, it is possible to see the financial reform of colonial administration as the more pressing concern of French authorities, ensuring that whilst greater autonomy was granted to indigenous representative bodies the pegging of colonial financial markets to the Franc meant that they remained 'essentially satellites of the French monetary system.'​[25]​ As such, Pierre Alexandre posits that there were tangible 'advantages in laying down the White Man’s Burden.'​[26]​ This analysis is confirmed in governmental memos on the state of change before the implementation of the loi cadre during Faure’s premiership, which cited 'le poids de fardeau' as a mitigating factor in negotiating French involvement in direct administration.​[27]​ France’s economic interests were protected whilst seeming to reclaim the initiative in colonial reform, cutting administrative costs and ensuring the continued dependency of her colonies. 
The loi cadre likewise moved to curb specific movements within AOF that lobbied for continued, and expensive, reform by placing the reins of local administrative spending in the hands of local assemblies. The spectre of radical political engagement therefore elicited the concentration of power amongst élus intent on denying the existence of a class struggle within the African context, such as Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the long-standing leader of Ivorian politics and staunch ally of French power. Consequently, social division could be couched in the terms of interest or area, rather than by invoking class and spatial groupings.​[28]​ Such politics encouraged adherence to local power networks over any temptation to supra-local appeals, hoping to bog down political boisterousness in the periphery before it ever troubled the centre. Indeed, Véronique Dimier astutely points out that Defferre was likewise the legislator at the centre of the 1982 Metropolitan decentralisation project, and casts the loi cadre as a significant step in a continuous process of structural formalisation in which the 1946 constitution was the first attempt to articulate the principles of modern colonial interaction.​[29]​ Defferre's 1982 review and the 1956 loi cadre transformed politics in similar ways:  both acts opened up the opportunity for greater representation of local interests in local party politics, thereby enlarging the possibilities for clientelism at a municipal level. 
In AOF, the co-option of private companies to deliver targeted investment was designed to improve the profitability of colonial investments by complementing the injection of funds into infrastructure made by the colonial state. Such close cooperation between state and private sectors in order to realise specific development goals drew directly on the precedent set by Jean Monnet in directing post-war economic recovery in France.​[30]​ By following this model, business was brought closer to government (and vice-versa) thereby allowing for a greater degree of clientelism to standardise interests across institutional power groupings. Such para-political interests are a central hallmark of colonial modernism in John Darwin’s 'late colonial' model, with commercial will extremely close to political reality.​[31]​ In this same way, the direct decentralisation of local administration undertaken in the loi cadre allowed tighter restrictions on reserved matters, such as those governing the administration of private investment in the colonies. 
However, Metropolitan companies registered in France and paying taxes into Metropolitan coffers left a colonial tax system burdened with raising 97 per cent of its levy from collective rural enterprises, emphasising the remoteness of foreign capital from indigenous development. Within this particular document, it is also stated that legislative reform must focus on reforming customs and duty laws, so as not to penalise excessively those 'qui procure au pays ses moyens de paiement à l’extérieur'.​[32]​ This model of taxation was designed to offer protection to internal industry and, resultantly, the loi cadre enshrined at its heart financial incentives which would support an 'harmonisation des relations financières entre la Métropole et les territoires d’outre-mer.'​[33]​ Recognition of the most successful aspects of the colonial economy was vital in order to underpin the economic fundamentals of colonial governance. 
The remoteness of foreign ventures from the indigenous population, however, meant that such favoured tax and regulatory status contributed only to the enrichment of private interests and Metropolitan government, leaving the colonial administration all but dependent on capital invested through the paternal Metropolitan state. At this stage, therefore, it is necessary to examine the dynamics of private capital and how it was both shaped and accommodated within the development model set out by colonial authorities.
With the extent of what Keynes would refer to as economic ‘leakage’  caused by capital leaving the colonies in external profit-flow, the requisite ‘injection’ had to be drastic in order to create any workable equilibrium.​[34]​ The reform of market structures in the loi cadre, therefore, was designed to ensure that the liabilities of the colonial administration were diversified across private companies linked to the government., tThuis ensuring ensured continued efficiency in the generation of capital, whilst writing off many direct costs. Relying on aOn outdated models of protectionism became untenable 'lorsque la Métropole soutient la production qui est frappée par les droits en question', and the focus of fiscal reform laid out in the loi cadre became to diversify links to Metropolitan France without diminishing the potential for investment in the colonies.​[35]​ In this manner, the direct export of products to the Metropolitan government could be diminished without any real threat to the continued fiscal relationship owing to 'l’existence d’un réseau de maisons françaises installées de longue date en A.O.F., qui maintiendront des liens commerciaux et qui rapatrieront en France les intérêts et bénéfices.'​[36]​ Likewise, the implementation of the Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) in 1945 had bound the economies of the Zone Franc in the hope of creating stable growth across Africa through lower inflation rates, greater budgetary standardisation and reduced administration costs. That the CFA was issued by banks in Dakar and guaranteed by the treasury in Paris serves as a tidy metaphor for the French vision of aloof yet bound interaction.​[37]​ The agglomeration of interests occurring between administrators and private finance allowed France to retain a protected segment of the national Metropolitan economy whilst acknowledging the prevailing European model of greater deregulation.
The virtual non-existence of the mechanisms for furnishing finished goods constituted one of the primary lines that would bind France and AOF in an increasingly decentralised political relationship.​[38]​ Greater fiscal autonomy within local administrative assemblies did not diminish the need to increase the value of primary products by creating finished goods. Due to France’s management of the colony, however, this necessity reinforced the structures of the colonial state. Being sensitive to the desires of French industry, Metropolitan legislators ensured that the monopoly on lumber-processing, flour-milling and sugar-refining remained with large-scale Metropolitan firms.​[39]​ By ensuring that the loi cadre had strengthened the monopoly of market, product and route to market, ​[40]​ France French officials was were able to allow for greater autonomy in the knowledge that local interests were still bound by the same economic fundamentals which had always applied to the colonies. Jean Suret-Canale highlights that this graduated industrial capacity 'strengthened the hold of the commercial companies over the economy rather than threatening it.'​[41]​ This system allowed a greater divestment of governmental responsibility for the immediate capital needed to develop the colonial market and ensured a constant liquidity of resources.
Within this system of ‘leakages and injections’ France had likewise diversified her liabilities. By halving the burden of injections between state and private capital, Metropolitan interests were better served by investment in infrastructure, allowing a complementary injection of capital from the private sector into riskier ventures. A correspondent halving of the leakages market was not entirely disastrous, however, as increasingly efficient operations allowed France to increase the real value of leakages obtained through direct government bodies (for example in mining) or through taxation in the Métropole (as was the case with shipping). The interaction of Metropolitan commerce and colonial reform was therefore an exercise in diversifying liabilities, pursuing a technocratic approach to bettering France’s balance sheet if not indeed her conscience. 
With the advent of the loi cadre, problems surrounding the continued ability to coordinate such markets were quickly overcome. The stringency of  Mmetropolitan economic planning diminished the ability of political reformers to devolve control of fiscal policy to autonomous structures as it would play havoc with projections and targeted development strategies. As such the fiscal autonomy of local assemblies was minute in comparison to their requisite political autonomy. Ensuring that investment into the colonial state shadowed the private investment into productive industry had been, in part, the function of the Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement Économique et Social (FIDES) program, which moved to streamline investment opportunities whilst in some sense ameliorating conditions within the colonies. By looking at how the FIDES program interacted with private capital, we can also gain a sense of the spirit in which the colony was run and the extent to which the loi cadre was responsible for entrenching latent trends in colonial administration.
The initial motivation for implementing the FIDES fund in 1948 can be partially understood as an attempt by French authorities to fill the gap which private investment had created in the development of the AOF since the Second World War. The provision of state aid clearly recognised, at least in part, a moral responsibility to the colonies, although Gordon Cumming points out that 'altruistic motives were insufficient in themselves to sustain a large aid budget.'​[42]​ Even beyond independence, investment required in these young nations was largely that of infrastructure and primary industrial development, areas 'neither of interest nor of profit to private capital.'​[43]​ Capital flowing towards AOF from Metropolitan firms, therefore, tended to be targeted at maximising profitability, ensuring the maintenance of an import market for expensive manufactured goods and the export of relatively cheap supplies with little desire to engender any industrialisation that would unbalance this simplistic yet palatable equation.​[44]​ 
The importance of private capital to the colonial project was discussed at the time, recognised internationally as a key consideration of colonial reform. René Massigli, the former Foreign Office grandee who was in 1956 attached to the Royal Court in Britain as French Ambassador, spoke at the Stevenson Memorial Lecture to introduce, describing the shift represented by the loi cadre to a British audience. Massigli, addressing attendees from Chatham House and the London School of Economics, sought to highlight the novelty of French administrative thinking embodied by the loi cadre. After describing the representative changes entailed, Massigli explained the economic importance of the provisions of the loi cadre:
'As to private investments in under-developed countries, it cannot be overlooked that the Suez crisis made capitalists even more cautious than before. Special provisions have therefore been made to enable the territories to conclude with new investors long-term agreements guaranteeing stability during a reasonable period of time and general conditions of a legal, economic, and financial nature designed to secure efficient operation. Several territories have already made use of those provisions. In the Ivory Coast, as in Guinea and Gabon, the period of preliminary studies is over and work has actually started on various schemes of considerable importance'​[45]​ 
The importance of these provisions for private investment was made paramount by an unstable colonial climate, both for Great Britain and for France. The way in which Nasser had nationalised private interests in Egypt had offered a cautionary example of the dangers of independence for international investors (usually with ties to the Métropole). The targeting of governmental investment into infrastructure (as seen with FIDES) mirrored the investment of large companies into mining exploration and irrigation projects, establishing the roots of a relationship that saw further internationalization of capital after 1960 brought independence.​[46]​ This trend was both encouraged and aided by the provisions of the loi cadre. Minimising risk and diversifying the terms of investment to preclude costly direct state administration proved a useful reserve which satisfied critics at home and abroad when portrayed as 'une accroissement de l’efficacité d’institutions déjà en place.'​[47]​
This model was most prevalent in the funding of the largest and most profitable of African enterprises – mineral and metal extraction. For example, a Gabonese Senator, Paul Gondjout, tentatively enquired as to his administration’s ability to reform mining practices as a result of the loi cadre. This request was illuminatingly met with a curt and extremely clear message to abandon all such enquiries. In reiterating to the Senator that certain powers had not been devolved, the Ministre d’Outre-mer cited three separate decrees ensuring that power over the mining industry remained a reserved matter for the Metropolitan government.​[48]​ If the administration of visible local administrative cercles and clerical roles were to be devolved to Africans, it was essential that control over the economic fundamentals of what was a profitable asset remained firmly under Metropolitan control. This was the founding thought behind the separation of powers between Services d’État (those reserved by the French state and vital to national interests), and Services Territoriaux (those concerning the governance of the territory itself – increasingly devolved to indigenous elites). The separation between these powers were crucially left obscure, however, allowing a certain applied selectivity to govern which powers were adopted. Indeed, state agencies ensured that the Metropolitan government retained a controlling hand in both infrastructure and exploration, through organisations such as the Bureau Minier de la France d’Outre-mer, Atomic Energy Commission and the Petroleum Research Bureau.​[49]​ By providing some 25 billion Francs between 1946 and 1957 these agencies supported and controlled the development of mining and hydrocarbon exploration in the form of finance, whereby they supplied equity capital or loans to the four largest African mining enterprises (Managnese of Gabon, Alumina of Guinea, Phosphates of Senegal and Phosphates of Togo) and foundry (Edéa Aluminium Foundry in Cameroun) carrying out the practical exploration and exploitation of resources. Extraction industries such as mining, however, remained somewhat remote from the economy in general. With protected tax status, foreign ownership and a comparatively low effect on local employment, these industries served not as bastions of prosperity but rather indicators of lop-sided and uneven development.
By representing a profitable enterprise remote from the travails of the colonial economy in general, extractive industries saw increased investment by private capital backed by Metropolitan investment in distributive infrastructure. As Benno Ndulu highlights, this investment only led to 'narrow corridors of investment that served a commodity export sector.'​[50]​ The proportion of investment into the social sectors (health and education for example) was resultantly dwarfed by an overbearing proportion of targeted investment into infrastructure (ports, airports, electricity generation, roads and rail). In the first post-war economic plan the ratio was near four to one in favour of industrial investment, dropping to a ratio of two and a half to one in the second plan in response to rising political demands.​[51]​ Maintaining a core ratio of investment into infrastructural development ensured a continuing grasp on profit streams flexible enough to respond to pressures on both external market conditions and internal productive sources. This trend highlights the conceptual pre-history of the loi cadre which developed the reforms of FIDES and strengthened the mechanisms by which investment could be better diversified between state and private capital. In responding to the changing colonial scene, the loi cadre established some devolution of political authority, but stopped short of challenging the Fourth Republic Constitution, which had disavowed immediate decentralisation.​[52]​ Chafer highlights that the Constitution may have been functionally undermined, however, with the loi cadre coasting ahead of its remit.​[53]​ In partial recognition of this, and foreshadowing Chafer's analysis, Massigli termed the move unsurprising for the period, reflecting a changed approach to colonial relationships: 'This means, in effect, that these measures are in anticipation of a Constitutional reform. May I be allowed to suggest that this is a British rather than a French approach to an institutional problem?'​[54]​ In this sense the reform project represented a new discussion of political responsibilities ambiguous enough to appeal to those seeking reform in the Métropole and colonies without offending the increasingly reactionary colonial lobby at home. ​[55]​ 

III 
Reforming the terms of colonial interaction, then, was one of the major challenges facing the Fourth Republic, a period characterised by instability at home and abroad. Pacifying or managing the radical elements within colonial society was a prerequisite to investment: security and stability created a positive climate for business.  Yet the loi cadre was also geared towards realising the potential of assets, which represented opportunities for increasing Metropolitan revenue streams. Recognising the relationship between political reform and (sought for) economic development is key to realising the importance of the loi cadre, which built upon a long tradition of 'administrative pressure and intervention' as described by Jean Suret-Canale. By casting the political development of the AOF as bound to the synchronous development of economic apparatus, Suret-Canale constructs an image of domination based on 'a de facto monopoly' emerging from nineteenth century merchant ventures yet strengthened with increasing recourse to political authority.​[56]​ 
One practical example of a prominent business affecting policy can be seen in the development of the oil industry in France and the genesis of the Elf company. The aforementioned state-owned Bureau de Recherches de Pétrole (BRP) was founded in 1945 by the post-war De Gaulle Provisional Government before the advent of the Fourth Republic Constitution, and the BRP remained strongly influenced by staff loyal to the General. The BRP became increasingly involved in West Africa (and also Algeria) during the Fourth Republic, as it developed its resource exploration into the colonies. After decolonization, in 1966, the BRP would consolidate its constituent parts to form one of the world's largest oil companies, the Entreprise de Recherches et d’Activités Pétrolières (ERAP). This in turn began to trade under the brand-name Elf from 1967. As of 1956, following significant discoveries in France's African holdings, it held significant stakes in a number of companies: 65 per cent of Société des Pétroles de Madagascar, 51 per cent of Société de Recherche et d'Exploitation des Pétroles du Cameroun, 57.8 per cent of  Société des Pétroles de l' Afrique Équatoriale Française, and others.​[57]​ Nouschi highlights that none of these companies were headquartered in France and were thus immune from French legal controls regarding oil. Likewise, estimates of BRP spending in Africa demonstrate a clear strategic focus, with estimates ranging near to 30 per cent of total expenditure.​[58]​  Yet, at the same time, the prominent role of people like Pierre Guillaumat in private industry and their closeness to figures of political influence ensured that distinctions were blurred. Guillaumat, was head of the the Comité d'Énergie Atomique (CEA) from 1951 to 1958 and also of the BRP from 1954 to 1959, when he become the head of Elf-Aquitaine.  Guillaumat's close friendship with Jacques Foccart, who would come to be De Gaulle's chief African adviser, ensured that special interests could be coordinated and avoid potential friction. Whilst Defferre’s law was intended to advance the terms of colonial dialogue, his empowerment of private capital played into the hands of Gaullist allies already present in the colonies. Whilst it made good sense to empower para-political interests which kept the French economy dynamic and promised further resource exploration, it also empowered people like Foccart serving as a fundraiser and campaigner for the RPF even as he concentrated on the profitability of the BRP and, eventually, Elf. 
Again, however, acknowledging the endemic conflicts of interest which governed colonial administration is not meant to portray some grand conspiracy but rather to illustrate the structures that underpinned the colonial relationship, a relationship geared toward external profit. To cast the loi cadre as a symptom of an interminable slide towards decolonization is to obfuscate the reality of AOF’s colonial narrative, which duly places this legal reform at the heart of a regeneration project designed to maintain France’s stake in what ultimately was a different class of financial asset. Planners recognised the need to diversify the French economy, and in particular to give it the appearance of greater equity.
	'De toute façon, si la Métropole conçoit bien son véritable intérêt, si elle veut le faire prévaloir contre les intérêts particuliers qui, jusqu'à présent, ont dominé sa politique économique Outre-Mer, elle doit comprendre que c'est sur ce point qu'il faut faire porter le sacrifice. A vouloir tout conserver on finit par tout perdre.'​[59]​
That burden was the relaxation of direct controls and the devolution of tax-collecting and local budget setting to the dual cadre system. Yet, as the post-decolonization history of West Africa attests, the 'special interests' were never fully exorcised from policy making. 
The theme of abandonment cast a shadow over the discussion of colonial reform in the political foreground of both the Métropole and AOF. Immediate disengagement evoked an ideological climb down from France’s self-conceived civilising mission, which, furthermore, would have a massively destabilising effect on a government formed as recently as January of 1956 - and with a slim majority.​[60]​ As such, colonial reform was warned away from changes that could be seen as revolutionary in favour of a more conciliatory program nonetheless rapidly implemented.​[61]​ An increasing shift towards decolonization by nations such as Britain and the Netherlands constituted a challenge to the status quo of France’s colonial consensus, with a tangible air of progress elsewhere robbing France of her political initiative and representing 'une source de difficultés possible avec les gouvernements des pays possessions en Afrique.'​[62]​ Indeed, from 1947, British popular opinion had cast France as behind the times in terms of colonial administration, with newspapers openly expressing the opinion that continued collaborative meetings might see her neighbours 'lured [towards the extension of self-government] by a process of sheer empiricism.'​[63]​ The extent of such fears can be seen in the admission that the best course of action for French authorities lay in the advice that 'nous pourrions alors modifier notre attitude' and 'encourager discrètement' interests within French Africa, a view contrary to calls for detachment.​[64]​ Such diplomatic manoeuvring was specifically designed to counteract a growing number of claims made by figures such as Ghana’s nationalist leader Kwame Nkrumah that underdevelopment was a direct product of colonial rule.​[65]​ 
By recognising that 'Les autochtones sont mécontents', ministers were driven to give an impression of dynamism within the colonies and 'créer un climat nouveau, qui permettra une entente plus confiante et plus cordiale entre Européens et autochtones.'​[66]​The focus here, as always, is on maintaining order and creating the conditions that made it possible for continued economic and political engagement without immediately suggesting self-government. France’s ambassador in London had in turn respondedopined in 1947 that the British approach to decentralisation was essentially defunct, relying, ironically enough, on 'le palliatif des conseils législative locaux.'​[67]​ That we see this becoming enshrined as the beating heart of French colonial policy less than a decade later in the loi cadre is in part recognition of this fact. Such a 'palliative' was precisely the remedy required in order to occasion a period of slow and stable growth in a peaceful and cooperative atmosphere. Progressive administrators thus forecast a more nuanced attachment to colonial territories, offering a technocratic variance on the direct administration of AOF. Stringent economic policy combined with a light hand in political management, thus ensuring continued dependency and allowing for dynamic political change: such was the shift in attitude embodied in the loi cadre.

IV
	Throughout the 1950s, e operating mantra of AOF’s colonial administration in the 1950s appears to have beenwas geared towards progress alongside and stability. Nascent pressure groups within the indigenous population were not viewed as overt and immediate challenges but instead as potential partners in governance, checking the advances of other groups less amicable to French interests. The necessity of policing a population who believed their relationship with colonial authorities was that of 'un patron et son chien,' however, is certainly clear.​[68]​ The loi cadre had the stated aim of ensuring that the colonial bond no longer had 'the semblance of a liability, rather of an offer of assistance and help.'​[69]​  By ensuring that France cooperated with the most competent and powerful leaders of pressure groups, colonial administrators effectively co-opted the cream of Africa’s political elite. As Cornut-Gentille observed, it was “ces nouvelles couches socialles en gestation et de leur assiette que dépend à la fois l’avenir de l’A.O.F. et les rélations entre France et Afrique Noire.”​[70]​ Identifying these competent leaders was not as arduous a task as it may have seemed for French authorities, as a generation of African political giants represented a virtual roll-call of graduating students from the Ecole William Ponty, a technical school which formed the hallmark of French patronage by providing a Metropolitan style education and gateway into broader opportunities. Educating the elites of French West African political and social movements presented France with acceptable interlocutors able to negotiate gradual amelioration of conditions in an acceptable political vernacular.​[71]​ Beyond this, French patronage of trade unions as the principle negotiating partner in African society allowed the careful harnessing of the quantum of action within the colonies. 
Perhaps one of the most politically curious aspects of the loi cadre is that it seems at first to be a sSocialist government acting against the interests of African trade unions to promote a continued agenda of colonial exploitation. Key to understanding this issue is the consistent Socialist Party policy that they would not support 'toute entreprise destiné à maintenir un colonialisme périmé.'​[72]​ The word périmé (out-dated) is central to the motivation behind Metropolitan mainstream political engagement with AOF: aside from left-wing commitments to modernising relationships on the basis of improving the quality of life for colonial subjects, the fundamental underpinning of colonial possession was endorsed by all parties of government.  
The politicisation of UGTAN represented a fact glaringly obvious in its conception, introduced as it had been by progressive elements within the Rassemblement démocratique africain (RDA), and pursuing 'l’action communiste.'​[73]​ Under the firebrand Sékou Touré, UGTAN successfully agitated for a more militant approach to unionism, pursuing for the first time a strategy of nationalism. Indeed, UGTAN was seen as having 'rejetté la lutte des classes et adopté la lutte anticolonialiste.'​[74]​ As has been thoroughly discussed in the work of Frederick Cooper, French administrators counteracted this tendency by enshrining the responsibility for local public works with the ‘Africanised’ assemblies, placing the responsibility for meeting demands from public sector workers in the domain of local taxes.​[75]​ This placed a dampener on wage demands by juxtaposing the equivalence of wages with territorial income, effectively curtailing the 'culture of demands.'​[76]​ Autonomy became both a positive image and a negative reality, as the loi cadre established a new framework for subverting dynamic movements by trapping them in their own demands.
The French attitude to syndicalist development is encapsulated perfectly in Defferre’s response to reports on a Trade union congress held in Cotonou. He, where he acknowledged that although there was a  momentum for change in evidence, within the syndicalist before suggesting a desire  it therefore fell to Metropolitan administrators to  to 'try to determine the right path towards the future.'​[77]​ Descrying social dynamism and pre-empting disturbances did not entail submission to those most dominant interest groups pushing for change. In a sense, Metropolitan legislators responded to the equality-levers used in union negotiation identified by Cooper in designating the labour movement as the most socially and politically dynamic movement of the day. The intention of the loi cadre was to take one step further and co-opt this movement as a force for stability. The centralisation of union strength within UGTAN served therefore as a positive development for colonial administrators as, despite its broadly nationalist stance, it housed divergent interests within one structure. Defferre’s motivation within the text of the loi cadre was, as in his reaction to Cotonou, to seize the initiative and set the course for social development to ensure that continued control served as the basis for continued security of French investments. As mentioned previously in Massigli's speech, the spectre of Suez could not be allowed to scare off investment and leave a gap which the government might need to plug. Indeed, SDECE (France's External Intelligence Agency) reports following the implementation of the loi cadre in 1957 issued a 'warning' in response to varied threats originating from syndicalist developments.​[78]​ The multitude of these reports focussed on figures such as Sékou Touré as the prime cause for agitation, with schisms in the labour unions triggering wider disturbances amongst supporters. 
Policing played a large part within the framework of controlling social dynamism, as France maintained a visible presence of uniformed officers controlled by colonial administrators. Policing and repression could only be effective against a larger background of compliance, however. With the involvement of French troops in Algeria, manpower was an issue at the forefront of colonial agendas. Disturbances across French Africa in 1947 had demonstrated the need to ensure that blanket policing could effectively defuse tension in cases of extreme need. Initial reports of impending disturbances gleaned from security forces led to an increase in police presence, allowing a focus on active security to preclude the need for purely reactive policing.​[79]​ The fevered manner in which officials reacted to what they admitted were 'rumeurs' portrayed the extent to which colonial officials were anxious to avoid a repeat either of the revolt in Madagascar or sustained conflict in Indochina or Algeria.​[80]​
In an open statement of Metropolitan clientelist strategy in managing power networks in the colonies, a departmental note acknowledges that 'l’autorité d’Houphouet et du RDA, en Côte D’Ivoire a contribué à éviter jusqu’à présent l’agitation sociale.'​[81]​ By securing the stability of the most lucrative territory within AOF, administrators were able to concentrate on the provision of services for poorer territories where the risk of agitation was higher. A memo written before the implementation of the loi cadre describes how spending levels had to be calculated by 'des besoins qu’elle doit satisfaire, with varying investment levels for urban and rural territories, and different spending brackets designed to draw local territories into line with a grand plan by varying means.​[82]​ By juggling investment levels while providing political patronage to visible leaders, France was able to cast a broad net, making progress seem more visible where it need be seen and more subtle where the risk of agitation was diminished.​[83]​ At the same time as these partners were identified, so too were para-political groups strengthening their influence, most notably embodied in the career of Jacques Foccart.
Frustration among other sections of French West African society grew as the legislative powers devolved to African elites by the loi cadre applied broadly to the areas in which social change was most required. Conflicting interest groups were then managed on a local level as indigenous elites assumed the management and organisation of services territoriaux. This permitted French authorities to effectively curtail any burgeoning signs of resentment in AOF, causing a disaggregation of dominant elites by altering the power structure of colonial administration.​[84]​ Devolving some powers towards local administrators, in this sense, actually frustrated the independence movements developing within African societies, using the 'franchise as a kind of filter.'​[85]​ Tony Chafer quotes the nationalist leader Sékou Touré in his assessment of the project being undertaken by reformers:
'The territorial assemblies soon risk having to confront a heavy burden inherited from successive governments: that of too many legitimate demands not satisfied. They will then find themselves faced with the following dilemma: either to satisfy the civil servants’ ambitions by making the peasant farmers pay the price, or to take account of the farmers’ difficulties , which their poverty would justify, and reject the workers’ demands.'​[86]​
Touré highlights the importance of shifting from French authorities the burden of satisfying demands, decoupling the association of thwarted demands with distant colonial powers. Chafer goes on to highlight how debates over the equivalence of civil servant pay between West African states helped break down inter-territorial solidarity. Levels of pay set in Senegal, increasingly the locus of West African politicking, were difficult to justify and indeed to afford in territories in Guinea, where leaders had to satisfy their own territorial electorate. As a result, difficult decisions were taken to decouple African civil servants’ pay from Metropolitan levels, first of all in Guinea.​[87]​
This impact of the loi cadre also held true for taxation. Local taxes had to address social issues across an increasingly disparate rural and urban indigenous population, a position which further highlighted the gap between the relative success of the unions and the rest of the population.​[88]​ Indeed, the Ministry for Overseas France expressed private concerns that territorial representation by elites reliant on a broadly rural electorate might create a cleavage between parliamentary dialogue and the political reality of AOF, with these representatives 'ne semblent pas prendre conscience du danger' of syndicalist agitation. ​[89]​ This worry helps explain the continued attempt to encourage the diversification of the socially dynamic union movement into rural areas as a tactic to ensure that agitators within the syndicalist network had 'combattre à visage découvertwere forced ‘to show their true colours.’'​[90]​
Such social cleavages increased the disparity between the labour and nationalist movements, as the championing of specific labour issues within the context of national development became unsustainable, and union leaders, for example Sékou Touré, had to diversify their appeal and subjugate class to national concerns. Despite Cooper’s assessment that devolving legislature to elected indigenous assemblies represented a Metropolitan frustration with the development project, it can be argued that continued attempts to manage the colonies in a manner which maintained French involvement represented a circumvention of traditional methods of administration in favour of a more indirect control mechanism which ensured stability even while lessening engagement. This shift in France’s attitude to colonial interaction ensured continued French involvement, while offering a different colonial perspective to indigenous elites. The promises that became tangible enticements to cooperation, however, could not exist as bare totems of distant French grandeur and needed to be realized. It was in the control of economic policy which France followed through and targeted investment to create images of progress and cement mechanisms of control. By exploring the extent to which France engaged with her colonies financially it becomes possible to create a brand which was appealing to colonial populations. Investment was delivered, however it was targeted towards ensuring the security of investments as it had been when diversifying infrastructure through FIDES, and attracting private capital as it did when strengthening para-political interests operating in the colonies 

VI
Bridging Metropolitan concerns about losing the grandeur of an empire and the countervailing desire for their economic abandonment proved a difficult mandate for Guy Mollet’s government. Yet, the loi cadre allowed for a significant and visible shift in the governmental attitudes to colonial interaction, appealing to reformists on both sides of the debate. Beyond these concessions to colonial administration, however, the true purpose and real success of the loi cadre was in ensuring the continued economic security of France through her reform of financial markets. In this sense, shifting attitudes to colonial interaction reflected the increasingly technocratic attitude of the Fourth Republic. The creation of a market beholden to France’s targeted development industries ensured that national protectionism could extend to an international context. Colonial spending was also reduced, as talk of equivalence amongst the powerful labour movement was headed off by the investing of power in local administrations, itself a more attractive option than direct administration. Diverse mandates likewise produced a degree of dependency on French support as a legitimising force for indigenous politics, stifling excessive agitation for either communism or nationalism. The nature of those in power, as well as the nature of their dependency on French financial support, in turn, ensured a degree of compliance that was underwritten by France’s ability to dissolve local assemblies. 
The loi cadre was essential to refining the Fourth Republic's engagement with colonial markets and also reducing the exposure of state capital to risk within that model. Further to this, the savings made from direct colonial administration helped refill French coffers augmented by increasingly favourable tax protection for trade with her colonies during a period of broader market deregulation. Amidst a climate of turbulent social dynamism, France altered the framework of interaction with AOF whilst maintaining the economic fundamentals that had ensured colonial profitability in the past. By both creating an atmosphere of progressive politics within AOF and underwriting progress with a staunch economic retrenchment, French legislators attempted the work of a sorcerer. Manipulating social dynamism through accession to eager demands for indigenous control whetted the appetite of African political figures while at the same time denying them the opportunity to progress as local administrations soaked up the grievances previously directed at the colonial state. Likewise, addressing wage demands with local budgets contextualised the gains granted to unionised workers by the French colonial state and diminished the ability of union leaders to agitate for wage equivalence. In this sense, African political elites played apprentice to the Metropolitan sorcerer by helping to ratify the illusion of progress.
The control of colonial markets ensured that the dependency France engendered amongst a colonial administrative elite was tangibly echoed in the administrative process, with the loi cadre establishing many of the economic ties that were to remain consistent and form the basis of later post-colonial interaction. Ensuring that Metropolitan trade remained firmly entrenched in African markets allowed the manipulation of tariffs and export legislation to create a circular flow of capital injection from large industry designed to act as a patch for markets which leaked profusely into the outstretched coffers of the Métropole. The proximity of these interests to the administrative elite of the colonial state meant that what was good for political stability was good for business. 
As such, the loi cadre can be seen as the primary tool with which France altered the terms of her colonial interaction and sought to cultivate a multi-faceted African dependency on the Métropole, promising to guarantee stability in the face of an increasingly dynamic colonial climate. Whilst it has been argued that the slide towards decolonization was neither 'inevitable' nor expected, we must acknowledge that French administrators did acknowledge and address frailties in the colonial system in an attempt to modify and preserve colonial mastery. As the All-African People's Conference identified in 1961, colonialism was to give way to neo-colonialism:
The survival of the colonial system in spite of formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries, which become the victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, military, or technical means.​[91]​
The grander processes of neo-colonialism have been well discussed elsewhere, yet this rereading of the loi cadre has attempted to understand the means by which the subtle cultivation of dependency had begun in earnest by the mid 1950s.​[92]​ The attitudinal shift that the loi cadre marked was indicative of the government’s need to diversify France’s assets in a period of heightened African self-assertiveness compounded by domestic criticism surrounding the cost of France’s African adventure. As a nuanced and responsive attempt to craft an imperial future, it seems that the loi cadre, with its subtle social controls and sound economic fundamentals, signified far more than has been traditionally appreciated and represents perhaps one of the final attempts in modern history to utilise such a broad subject territory as a credible financial asset. This reading re-emphasises the role of African activists in the colonial struggle by highlighting the fallacy of a gradual slide towards decolonization. Likewise, the complexity and endurance of post-colonial relationships can be understood in part by the obfuscation of economic relationships that took place in these last years of direct administration. If the loi cadre granted some political freedom in the short term, it moved to ensure that diversified economic bonds and a carefully cultivated dependency would endure long after the Métropole had officially disengaged with AOF.
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